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The Academic Perspective
The Prosecutorial Ethic: With Great Power Comes
Great Responsibility
by Professor Maureen Howard ‘86

spring 2010

Although the American trial system has been likened to an arena in
which mental combatants fight “to
the death” (the verdict), each warrior similarly skilled and equally
committed to vanquishing the other in a forum with formal rules of
engagement enforced by a learned
and impartial judge, the role of the
criminal prosecutor is qualitatively
different from that of other advocates. This is because, unlike any
other lawyer, a criminal prosecutor has an affirmative duty to the
opposing party.
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A lawyer who represents an individual client is
duty-bound to advance that client’s interests vigorously within the bounds of the law. A prosecutor,
however, does not represent a single individual,
but the collective good. As such, a prosecutor’s
loyalties—unlike other lawyers—are not undivided. A prosecutor’s duties include insurance of
procedural and substantive fairness to persons
accused of crime because, as one element of a
just society, it is in the interests of the collective
good. Further, because the defendant is a member of the “represented” collective, a prosecutor
must take the defendant’s interests into account in
assessing the validity of the prosecution.
Under most ethical rules and guidelines, including the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, prosecuting attorneys are generally held to a different,
and some have said higher, standard from that
of attorneys representing clients. This differing
standard takes into account the fact that the
roles of prosecutor and defense counsel are not
symmetrical. The defense attorney is charged
only with her client’s well-being; she has no corresponding “duty” to the government during the
course of the case. Not so for the prosecutor.
The ethical duty of a prosecuting attorney goes
beyond advocacy; unlike other trial lawyers, a
prosecutor is duty-bound to “seek justice.” This

responsibility to seek justice includes a duty to
the defendant.
As such, ethical guidelines recognize that a prosecutor is a “minister of justice” whose duty is to
seek justice, not merely convict. Jurists and scholars
have long opined on the meaning of the prosecutor’s role as a “minister of justice.” Former U.S.
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas asserted
that the prosecutor’s role is “to vindicate the rights
of people as expressed in the laws and give those
accused of crime a fair trial.” In Berger v. United
States, the Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor stands in the place of the sovereign “whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” The
Court emphasized that the prosecutor’s interest in
a criminal case is not to win but to see that justice
is done: “He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one.”
Not only is the ethical duty of the prosecutor distinct from that of other lawyers, but some scholars
have called for a “moral standard” as well, given the
immense, unregulated discretionary power of the
prosecutor’s office. As law professer and former prosecutor Bennett L. Gershman wrote: “Why a standard
of moral certainty? Such a standard fits the reality that
the prosecutor is the gatekeeper of justice. It requires
the prosecutor to engage in a rigorous moral dialogue
in the context of factual, political, experiential, and
ethical considerations. It also requires the prosecutor
to make and give effect to the kinds of bedrock value
judgments that underlie our system of justice—that
the objective of convicting guilty persons is outweighed by the objective of ensuring that innocent
persons are not punished.”
The prosecution has the full weight and power of
the government behind it (including the assistance of
police investigative and enforcement resources) as it
enters a criminal trial. The constitutional protections
afforded criminal defendants—such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of
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innocence, the stringent beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict
to convict—exist to counter the innate power imbalance that favors the government.
The prosecution carries a disproportionate burden as
a matter of public policy in other areas of criminal law
practice as well. One example is the duty to produce
exculpatory evidence to the defense—voluntarily and
without request. The prosecutor may also have a duty
to search for evidence that may potentially damage
her case, whereas the defense clearly has no corresponding duty.
Likewise, prosecutors have a different duty from that
of defense counsel with respect to witness examination. A prosecutor cannot cross-examine a defense
witness to attack his credibility for truthfulness when
she knows the witness is truthful. A defense attorney,
however, is not likewise so clearly prohibited. Nor can
a prosecutor call a witness to the stand whom she
knows is likely to perjure himself. In some jurisdictions,
however, a defense lawyer may allow the defendant
to testify in the narrative, even when aware the testimony will be false.
Some jurisdictions also recognize there need not be
an equal number peremptory challenges afforded the
prosecution and the defense. With respect to noncapital felonies, the prosecution is allotted fewer peremptory challenges than the defense in many states
as well as in the federal system. This policy has existed
for decades. It was recognized in the English system

as well, which eliminated peremptory challenges for
prosecutors in criminal actions in 1825.
The responsibilities of a prosecutor do not, however,
extend exclusively to those cases assigned to her. National ethical guidelines charge prosecutors with the
duty to “seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal justice.” This requires a prosecutor to
look beyond her caseload, or even the practices of her
unit, or her office, and be a champion for accountability and change if needed.
A recent study by The Center for Public Integrity
of local prosecution practices across 2,341 jurisdictions reported an unsettling account of prosecutorial
misconduct—cases where prosecutors broke or bent
the rules to win convictions. In the study, Harmful
Error: Investigating America’s Local Prosecutors, the
authors report that, since 1970, individual judges and
appellate court panels cited prosecutorial misconduct
as a factor when dismissing charges, reversing convictions or reducing sentences in over 2,000 cases. In
another 500 cases, appellate judges offered opinions—
either dissents or concurrences—in which they found
the misconduct warranted a reversal. In thousands
more, judges labeled prosecutorial behavior inappropriate, but upheld convictions reasoning the behavior
constituted “harmless error.”
The abuse of prosecutorial discretion and power by
any prosecutor is, on some level, a failure of prosecutors everywhere. The goal of each prosecutor should
not just be ethical practice and personal accountability
in his or her assigned cases, but systemic accountability
and defensibility of practice nationwide.
In May 2008, the School of Law hosted a symposium
on the prosecutorial ethic in honor of alumnus King
County Prosecutor Norm Maleng. National scholars,
judges, prosecutors and defense counsel came together to exchange ideas and challenge preconceptions
about the role and responsibilities of the prosecutor.
The exercise was invigorating and generated several
innovative ideas, including a proposal to create a
prosecutorial clinic at the School of Law where student
instruction would be jointly undertaken by law professors, judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers.
The concept of a multi-disciplined faculty endorses
Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz’s view
that “[d]espite the theoretically adversarial nature of
our system, the prosecutor is among the most important arbiters of justice” due to her discretion in investigating and resolving criminal matters, thus elevating
her to a “quasi-judicial” role. Early education regarding the prosecutorial ethic at the law school level can
better prepare students who embark on careers in
prosecution to understand and embrace the challenge
that ethical prosecution across all cases, in all jurisdictions, is a societal benefit that every prosecutor is
duty-bound to pursue.
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